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Abstract: Much of VET policy internationally draws on a toolkit that has been seriously 
questioned for its logic, international relevance and effectiveness by considerable amounts 
of academic research. Reflecting primarily on our experiences of leading a complex, multi-
country policy study, we develop an account that seeks to explore ways in which the 
apparent incommensurability between academic and policy knowledge can be addressed. 
This leads on to a broader discussion of key issues of contestation in the debates about 
knowledge for policy as they relate to international education and development more 
generally. We consider three key turns in the discourse of international education policy 
and research: to "governing by numbers", "what works" and policy learning, and ask what 
happens when these discursive trends travel to Southern and VET contexts. We suggest 
that this analysis implies that policymakers need both to be more modest and reflexive in 
their expectations of what knowledge can be mobilised for policy purposes and more 
serious in their commitment to supporting the generation of the types of knowledge that 
they claim to value. For international and comparative educators, we stress the importance 
of being clearer in seeking to shape research agendas; more rigorous in our approaches to 
research; and better in our external communication of our findings. Given the particular 
focus of this special issue on VET, we end by reiterating the particular challenge of 





There is typically a large gap between policy and academic accounts of vocational  
education and training (VET). Several articles in this special issue refer to the VET policy  
toolkit, which is “known” by policymakers to be a sound basis for their work as such  
reforms have worked elsewhere and so will work in their countries too. However, these  
articles go on to present a very different set of accounts in which academics have a  
different knowledge, namely that these travelling policies exist more soundly at the level  
of discourse than that “of objective fact” and / or national contexts matter more than  
generalisable laws of VET reform. In this view, the toolkit does not work, or at least not  
fully and consistently. Indeed, one of the other papers presented in the UKFIET  
conference strand from which this special issue derives, provided an exemplary case  
from Mozambique. In it, Billetoft (2011) showed how, with donor support, Mozambique  
constructed a best practice policy but has not been able to make it work because it is not  
grounded in a realistic sense of how policy can be operationalised in this particular national 
context.1 
 
Beyond the specifics of VET policymaking, there are wider processes at work in  
education policymaking globally and in development planning that are seeking not only  
to build policy on a stronger evidential base but also to shift academic research so that it  
is more relevant and responsive to the needs of policymakers. Although such approaches  
have been around in both education and in other fields of public policy in some  
developed countries for as much as a quarter of a century, there appears to be a rapidly  
rising interest amongst development cooperation agencies regarding such approaches as  
they apply to education-for-development. These trends are too new to have attracted  
much in the way of academic analysis and this is an important motivation for the current  
article.  
 
                                                          
1
 See also Norrag News 46 for a discussion of many of the issues of this volume. 
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For academics working in the field of international and comparative education (the core 
readership of IJED), notions that deconstruct international educational best practices are  
commonplace (cf. Chisholm and Leyendecker, 2008; Schweisfurth, 2011), even if the  
specificities of the evidence-based turn are not yet widely analysed. However, here we  
want to go beyond the current debate in two significant ways. First, we want to give  
more attention to addressing the apparent non-commensurability of academic and policy  
knowledges, using the specific area of VET as a way to stimulate a broader debate in the  
field of education-for-development. Second, we want to move past academic ways of  
knowing and doing in order to explore the possibilities that may lie in policy research for  
building bridges between policy and research as sites of knowledge production and  
practice. Of course, these bridges may be constructed differently to those built through  
the approaches to research deployed by policy analysts.  
 
In this paper, we offer our reflections of collaborative work in a single complex 
multinational  study, whilst drawing also on a combined nearly 40 years’ worth of work in  
academic, consultancy and policy settings on three continents. We seek to engage in a  
debate between academic and policy approaches rather than simply showing why policy  
cannot work, as has been the tendency of much of the academic work on this topic. In  
doing so, we will reflect both on what we consider to have been an important attempt to  
produce better policy at a regional level and on some of the wider methodological and  
epistemological challenges that exist in international policymaking, using the VET sector  
as a particular example.  
 
We will consider how our experiences inform three key debates about the knowledge for  
policy as it exists in the education sector. First, we consider the turn to “governing by  
numbers” (Rose, 1991; Ozga, 2009) and ask what happens when this discourse travels  
without the accompanying baggage of the technical and social capacities that are central  
to its operation in countries such as England. Second, we explore the way that a  
spreading to education-and-development settings of the discourse of “what works”  
research (Glass, 1987) and evidence-based policy (Thomas and Pring, 2004) is  
problematic and appears to contradict another element of the aid-development toolkit of  
the past decade – the move to working primarily at the policy level. Third, we  
interrogate the rise of policy learning as a potentially more emancipatory and egalitarian  
attempt to break out of policy borrowing, and as a practice through which to articulate  
policy research within policymaking, following and expanding upon Raffe’s (2011)  
critique of the limits and possibilities of policy learning in a Scottish context. These three  
debates overlap considerably and this will lead us to come back to the same issues and  
examples across the three themes in a way that is iterative and respectful of the  
messiness of reality.  
 
An exploration of these debates leads us to argue further that another major issue lies in  
the dominant tacit theory of policy both as being evidence-based and a driver of change.  
All of these issues are underpinned by two questions that prompted our writing of this  
article: why is there such a large gap between the policy stories about what works in  
VET internationally and the academic stories of what doesn’t work? And what, if  
anything, can be done to bridge this gap?  
 
We are very conscious and critical of the wider tendency to impose Northern theory on  
the South (cf. Connell, 2007; McGrath and Mason, 2011), so it is important to  
acknowledge the use of these Northern accounts, and broader Northern literatures on  
social theory and on policy that underpin such accounts. Our intention is not to see these  
theories as universal and then apply them to Southern contexts. Rather, it is to use  
them as a set of lenses through which we can set up a tension between global policy  
discourses and complex national and regional spaces in which practice, policy and  
research are enacted.  
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SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
The writing of this paper has been challenging for two interlocking reasons that are  
important to make more transparent to readers. First, we are writing as two authors but  
the main project we are reflecting upon included 20 researchers, two funding agencies  
and several hundred stakeholders who participated in national and regional workshops.  
This raised important ethical questions regarding our right to write a single version of  
the multiple accounts that could be told of that project, particularly as European-based  
participants in a process that was largely African in its ownership and participation. We  
concluded that all we could do was to be respectful of the roles of others and mindful of  
the potential partiality and partialness of our account. Crucially, we are convinced of the  
importance of what we want to say and that it would remain unsaid if we do not take  
advantage of our capabilities to publish in an international journal.  
 
Second, we are grappling with serious epistemological and methodological challenges.  
On deciding to write this paper, we knew that there were very major theoretical issues  
with which we wanted to engage based on a particular project in which we had  
collaborated but also arising out of our much larger combined experience of professional  
experience straddling academia, consultancy and policy work. However, we also knew  
that our knowing came from our professional engagement in the world and our critical  
reflection thereon rather than primarily from systematically collected data. Also, we were  
very aware that the impossibility of triangulating much of what we thought we knew  
against the perceptions of others could make our story open to contestation as codified  
knowledge. Moreover, some of what we knew was also potentially unsayable in other  
ways: because of confidentiality clauses signed in some of the many projects in which  
we have worked; or because of the challenges of maintaining access to potential clients  
and funders. Nonetheless, it is our contention that these matters needed to be inserted  
into the academic debate, particularly as this special issue has a key question running  
through it to which we could contribute. Nagging away at both of us, but also other  
authors in this special issue, is the question of why there is a VET orthodoxy that seems  
to be oblivious to much of the evidence about its limited effectiveness. If the challenges  
and dangers of working across the research and consultancy domains are contributing to  
this, then we wished to engage in this discussion. Moreover, we realised that we needed  
to do so in a way that didn’t suggest that policymakers are naïve about research, but  
also attempted to provide at least some critical reflection on the weaknesses of academic  
approaches. We were also concerned to see if there was an insurmountable gap between  
different ways of knowing and doing VET policy and research or whether the potential  
existed for bridging this gap.  
 
What follows has three parts that are intended to bring differing lenses to bear on a  
complex and multifaceted issue. First, we introduce and discuss the project that led to us  
writing this paper, exploring it as a case of trying to bridge the gap we identify above.  
Second, we seek to problematise this case (and some of our other experiences in policy  
and evaluation work) within a wider theoretical discussion of the challenges that emerge  
from thinking about processes of learning and evidence gathering for policymaking.  
Third, we conclude with a reflection on what the interplay between these two levels of  
discussion provides in the way of some possible conclusions about the limitations and  
possibilities of more effective dialogues between evidence and policy, and between  
academics and policymakers.  
 
 
THE SADC/UNESCO PROJECT  
Purposes of the SADC/UNESCO project  
 
In 2009 SADC announced that it was going to embark on a major policy review of VET in  
the Southern African region, as the prelude to a new regional policy initiative in this  
area. This study was to be co-financed by UNESCO. The origins of this announcement  
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appear to come from three sources. SADC had produced a regional protocol on VET in  
1997 (SADC, 1997) and had followed this up with work both on qualifications  
frameworks and on quality assurance systems (SADC, 2005 and 2007). However, there  
was a concern that a broader VET transformation agenda was important if the regional  
protocol was to translate into significant and widespread impact. As has been noted  
elsewhere in this special issue (McGrath, 2012), VET has become a more significant  
policy concern for UNESCO in recent years, and the proposed collaboration with SADC  
fitted very clearly to UNESCO.s preference for working collaboratively on policy work with  
national and regional structures. Moreover, for several years the CEOs of the region’s  
VET agencies had been seeking to build a collaborative learning project that could go  
beyond earlier work on VET in some countries in the region through a British-South  
African collaboration (Akoojee, Gewer and McGrath, 2005). Thus, the project was built,  
at least in part, on interest amongst national, regional and international policy actors in  
cross-border policy learning and a desire to ground this learning in evidence about policy  
effectiveness and system development.  
 
The eventual commissioning of this work also illustrated the concerns of these partners  
to work across the boundaries of academia, consultancy and policy. Although formally  
the heart of the project was a consultancy contract between SADC and a Netherlands- 
based consultancy firm, part of the attraction to the commissioning partners was that  
the team was led by a professor, who had also been the project manager of the earlier  
regional study and was widely published in this area, and included staff based at a  
regional university who had also previously worked for a national qualifications authority.  
The assessment and review of VET in the SADC region was implemented through a  
partnership between SADC, UNESCO and 13 of SADC.s member states and was intended  
to achieve several objectives at both national and regional levels. One of the key  
purposes was to build a regional strategic response for the revitalisation of VET in the  
region. This was to be founded on a baseline survey of the status of VET in the region,  
and the identification of intervention areas that would be “levers for VET in the region”  
(SADC and UNESCO, 2009). The logic of the intervention, therefore, was that  
comparative research on VET systems could identify the main drivers for reform, and  
that these could provide the basis of regional strategy to develop VET. This appears to  
have been grounded in an implicit view of reform that it is a technical-rational process  
that is driven from above, and one in which local subjectivities and contexts are  
irrelevant. We will come back to this issue later in the article.  
 
The implementation of the baseline survey of VET in the region was associated with a  
second purpose for the project; the development of a monitoring tool that would allow  
SADC member states to track and report their advancement in VET and milestones  
achieved (SADC and UNESCO, 2009). The tool was intended to “allow countries to  
identify peers in similar stages of implementation of various aspects of their reform  
processes allowing for more coherent and coordinated learning opportunities and  
discussion of common challenges” (SADC and UNESCO, 2009:4). Therefore, it would  
serve the dual purposes of monitoring progress in national VET reforms, as well as  
supporting peer learning through regional exchange, particularly the discussion of best  
practices and constraints identified through the review. Although the terms of reference  
did include a concern with constraints, this appeared in practice to be less important  
than best practices. Thus, the drive was to help countries identify “what is working” and,  
potentially to consider “why”, or “what makes it work”?  
 
Therefore, the project brought together ideas of regional monitoring of national VET  
system development, identification of best practices and peer learning through regional  
exchange. These continue to be central themes within discussions about VET in the  
SADC region (UNESCO-UNEVOC, 2011).  
 
Although the purpose of the project was to support policy learning within VET, the  
project was implemented through consultancy contracts with two teams of consultants: 
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a team of regional consultants, and 13 sets of national consultants. Although contracted  
separately, the regional and national teams were closely interdependent. The regional  
team comprised of five part-time team members, responsible for developing the  
research methodology and tools; providing research support to national consultants;  
analysing national findings and writing the regional report; and translating national  
experiences into a coherent regional strategic framework. National consultants were  
contracted by the UNESCO Cluster Offices in the region, and selected and appointed in  
each country by the relevant UNESCO National Commission. The UNESCO-appointed  
national consultants were all experts in VET, with particular expertise concerning the  
national VET context, and professional authority to lead a national, consultative study.  
Across the project, national consultants were drawn from a range of institutional  
locations, including freelance consultants, office bearers in national agencies, and  
university-based researchers. Many had prior experience as VET policymakers. Again,  
this reinforced the boundary crossing nature of the process, where researchers were  
selected because of their perceived ability to engage across academic, consultancy and  
policy domains. How these individuals knew VET in multiple ways, thus, was crucial and  
had major implications for how the project worked, as we shall consider later.  
The national consultants had primary responsibility for implementing the study within a  
specific national context, for data collection and reporting, and for facilitating a national  
stakeholder workshop to validate the national VET monitoring report and to identify  
national strategic priorities for regional support.  
 
 
Developing the tool: indicators  
 
Drafting the monitoring tool was the responsibility of the regional consultants. Although  
neither SADC nor UNESCO sought to specify the form that the monitoring tool should  
take, key areas to be addressed by the tool were identified. These included:  
 
. VET policy frameworks;  
 
. size, shape and structure of the system;  
 
. governance;  
. financing;  
. management and information systems; and  
. teacher training.  
 
SADC was also concerned to determine the extent to which there was a tendency  
towards harmonisation of VET policies, qualifications and quality assurance systems in  
the region. These are familiar features that are also considered through established  
monitoring processes in other regions including ReferNet in Europe. Indeed, the rise of  
approaches to cross-national comparison can be considered to be an important element  
of the international VET toolkit and, indeed, of wider policy tool kits linked to the rise of  
governance and performativity.  
 
The range of areas of interest suggested monitoring through different kinds of indicators  
and different forms of reporting data. For this, both qualitative and quantitative data  
were necessary, and therefore a mixed methods approach to the tool was proposed by  
the regional consultancy team, and agreed by the funders. Again, this is a decision that  
was of great significance in shaping how the project came to know VET in the region and  
provides a series of insights that we will bring to the wider discussion of VET knowledge  
for policy below.  
 
Two considerations were critical in the development of indicators for the monitoring tool.  
First, as dutiful consultants, we were strongly influenced by the priority areas set out in  
the terms of reference (see above). Second, we shared with SADC and UNESCO an  
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awareness that similar processes were ongoing elsewhere internationally. Indeed, the  
development of regional indicator sets for VET is most developed in the European Union.  
Our review of examples of indicator / cross-national reporting development in the EU  
was practically mindful of the very different contextual situation in Europe, including  
matters of capacity and resourcing, which meant that European models could not be  
borrowed for the SADC context. This reading was also theoretically informed by our  
grounding in the Sadlerian comparative education tradition, with its very strong concerns  
regarding matters of context (Crossley and Jarvis, 2001).  
 
In addition to reviewing monitoring tools used to evaluate European systems, work  
within the SADC region was also considered. This provided a sense of what data might  
be available at the national level in member states. Inevitably, this showed that there  
was a massive mismatch between research, monitoring and evaluation capacity in South  
Africa and in the rest of the region.  
 
A very provisional series of indicators and/or descriptors that the monitoring tool could  
include was identified. In considering indicators, there was a clear tension between a  
necessary ambition to cover as wide a range of data as might be seen to be required to  
give a full picture of a VET system, and an equally necessary modesty regarding what  
was feasible in terms of existing data sources and the available capacity for national  
officials to gather the requested data in the future. It was realised that some indicators  
may have been considered so important that they should be included even though data  
collection currently would be difficult. Issues of what data can be found readily and the  
dangers of being driven by data availability rather than fundamental policy goals will be  
returned to in the next section of this article.  
 
More than 100 possible indicators were identified. These were reduced to a list of 36  
based on an analytical reading of their importance for the process of VET reform in  
Southern Africa. This list was then ranked according to a combination of the priority of  
the indicator and the likely availability of data. Through dialogue with SADC and  
UNESCO, the long list of 36 was reduced to a second list of 18 indicators. Although this  
list was considered to be rather long, and we offered a further ranking of them against  
the above criteria of priority and availability, SADC and UNESCO officials felt strongly  
that all 18 indicators would be piloted as a strategy to test the limits of the tool. These  
indicators were then refined through a workshop with the national and regional  
consultants and both commissioning agencies, and the exact nature of the data to be  
collected against each agreed (the indicators are listed in Appendix 1). The tool included  
indicators of context, input, process, output and outcomes. Three broad kinds of  
indicator and report were included:  
 
• narrative reports,  
• ordinal reports (based on criterion-referenced ordinals) and  
• statistical reports.  
 
Whilst all indicators in the SADC monitoring tool are designed to assess the status of VET  
system development, ordinal reports provided a particularly immediate form of  
assessment. For these indicator reports, a five point scale was constructed with a score  
of 1 on the scale being associated with challenges faced without systemic interventions,  
through three broad phases of systemic development (scores 2, 3, 4), with a score of 5  
reflecting a mature or strong performance in terms of the indicator. A concern in  
developing the ordinal indicators was managing assumptions implicit within such scales  
of a pre-determined, ideal form of system development. We were also concerned about  
how ratings awarded within national relative frames of reference might become  
translated, inappropriately, into regional rankings. Again, these are issues to which we  
will return in the next part of this article.  
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Piloting the monitoring tool  
 
National consultants carried out the data collection required to complete the draft  
national VET monitoring report. This focused on accessing data that already existed at  
the national level, and three main sources of data were mined. To start with, the  
national consultants carried out an extensive review of the literature on VET in their own  
country. This included research literature, national policy documents and published  
reports on VET as well as any available monitoring or evaluation reports. National VET  
management and information systems were consulted in order to access data required to  
complete the reports on statistical indicators. Finally, a small number of interviews were  
carried out with key stakeholders in order to gain additional information required. The  
draft reports were then validated by national stakeholders through national workshops.  
These largely confirmed the draft reports, and in some cases were able to provide access  
to additional data. Significantly for the subject of this article, the workshops also  
revealed the value of the monitoring reports as a tool for dialogue within national VET  
systems. Stakeholders commented that they gained information on different parts of the  
sector and that debate around different perceptions on the system – perhaps particularly  
around different assessments and justifications for ordinal ratings – were extremely  
valuable.  
 
This process also illustrated issues regarding objectivity and subjectivity of rankings;  
serious limitations in existing data and availability of key documents; and the weak state  
of national VET capacity in some countries: issues that raise significant questions for our  
subsequent discussions.  
 
 
Outcomes of the project  
 
Within a remarkably short period of five months, 13 national monitoring reports were  
drafted, validated within national workshops and finalised. A regional report was  
produced and agreed at a further regional workshop by the commissioning agencies and  
national stakeholders, as was a draft strategy for responding to its key lessons. This was  
then presented to the regional Ministers of Education and approved in September 2011.  
Whilst national stakeholders and national consultants broadly affirmed the value of the  
monitoring tool as a strategy to enable national stakeholders to reflect on system  
development, a number of concerns were raised, particularly around the feasibility of a  
single blueprint meeting the needs of all contexts, and regarding how key national  
priorities should be included. As the lead consultants on the project, we also believe that  
the tool and the project as a whole largely worked in spite of its complexity and short 
timescale. We are confident that the report did provide a stronger evidential base than  
was previously available from which to inform policy. Indeed, the SADC Ministers of  
Education accepted both the report and a set of policy recommendations from it.  
Thus, it would have been possible to present this story largely as a successful case of  
evidence-based policy and / or policy learning and to finish our account there. However,  
we want to go beyond this version of the story, grounded as it is in policy and  
consultancy ways of knowing. Our intention in what follows is not to say that this version  
of the story is not a reasonable one. Rather, we want to offer another way of knowing  
the same issues from an academic perspective that is more concerned with  
epistemological and methodological debates regarding the complexities of knowing and  
doing vocational education and training reform. In so doing, we will bring together our  
reflections on this specific project with our wider knowledge and experience gathered as  
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KNOWING AND DOING VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING REFORM:  
SOME KEY DEBATES  
Governing by numbers  
 
For the purposes of this paper, we want to look at three elements of this process of  
governing by numbers. First, there is a general point about the rise of statistics to  
govern the world (cf. Goldstein, 2008; Gorard, 2008; Ozga, 2009). Second, there is a  
more specific issue regarding the weakness of VET data, including problems of definition  
and multiple forms of delivery, which make any attempt at data generation even more  
fraught than developing indicators on schools (cf. Jansen, 2005; Gorard, 2008; Lewin,  
2011). Third, there is a particular challenge regarding the objectification and  
quantification of qualitative and subjective judgments. Here, we will reflect on the  
specific case of our use of ordinal data in the SADC/UNESCO project but also some other  
experiences regarding how such ratings may change over time, a classic question of  
reliability.  
 
From a social constructivist perspective, statistics cannot be understood apart from the  
professionals who develop and analyse them and the environments in which these  
actions take place.  
 
Ozga (2009) critiques the ideological purpose of evaluation and statistics as arising from  
a shift from government to governance.  
 
The shift to governance is, in fact, heavily dependent on knowledge and  
information, which play a pivotal role both in the pervasiveness of governance  
and in allowing the development of its dispersed, distributed and  
disaggregated form. Data support and create new kinds of policy instrument  
that organise political relations through communication/information and hence  
legitimise that organisation (Ozga, 2009: 150)  
 
Thus the rise of statistics can be linked to the metaphor of toolkits used in McGrath’s and  
Lim’s papers in this issue. In this case, there is a governance toolkit, consisting of  
notions of governance, performativity, decentralisation, marketisation, etc., that both  
sits behind the VET toolkit unseen and which erupts into the VET toolkit around issues  
such as decentralisation and governance reforms. Indeed, one of the largest and most  
interesting discussions within the SADC/UNESCO project was around the issue of  
decentralisation. Whilst clearly part of this toolkit, or set of travelling policies, linked to  
the new public management (cf. McGrath, 2010a), decentralisation of VET was not seen  
as an unquestionable good to which numerical value could be ascribed. Rather, for South  
Africa in particular, a national belief in the need for the state itself to be performative  
and developmental led to a strong view that decentralisation led to poor policy  
implementation and, therefore, undermined achievement of developmental goals.  
At a methodological level, Gorard (2008) emphasises the professional judgments that  
typically lurk unseen behind statistics as publically presented. He reminds us that all  
statistics are subject to professional decisions regarding what to collect and how; how to  
manage data problems; and how to analyse and present data. This makes it impossible  
in strict terms to make confident comparisons of statistics over time and or space and  
undermines the processes of doing secondary analysis. Indeed, we would go further and  
argue that, epistemologically, those professional decisions are fraught with ideology and  
power.  
 
In the context of EFA, Lewin (2011: 576) argues that the understandable drive towards  
indicators brings potential problems:  
 
the discourse around EFA uses a range of key indicators to define and monitor  
progress. The problem is that each of these indicators comes with  
characteristics that may not be fully understood by those that use them. The  
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line between simple indicators that have traction in the politics of aid and the 
pressure on development partners and governments to be seen to “do 
something that makes a difference” sits uneasily with targets and indicators 
that are meaningful to both target setters and target getters and which can  
be used flexibly across a range of contexts. There is also a tension between  
indicators which satisfy ambitions for precision and comprehensiveness, and  
the realistic prospect of having reliable data on which to base their realisation  
and use.  
 
It was evident in the SADC/UNESCO process that there was a profound gap between our  
academic caution regarding the meaning of the statistics with which we were working  
and the concern of officials to have and use “hard” statistical data. The explanation for  
this may partly lie in different sources of risk. For the academic, a major source of risk  
comes from overclaiming and being too certain, given Popperian concerns about  
falsification and provisionality. However, for policymakers, and thus for consultants and  
advisors, risk lies far more in uncertainty and in the lack of clear and decisions and  
decisive actions.  
 
If Gorard can raise the above concerns about interpretation of quantitative data in the  
statistically sophisticated setting of England, then it is easy to imagine how more  
problematic the challenge is likely to be in the far more resource-poor settings of  
Southern Africa. Thus, in the SADC/UNESCO study we were faced by very serious  
questions regarding the nature of statistical data. Moreover, we inevitably faced a  
delicate and political tension regarding decisions of whether ultimately to exclude data  
which our professional judgment told us were below our threshold of acceptability even  
where these were official data that national stakeholders “knew to be true”.  
 
Ozga raises a wider issue about the relationship between data, governance and the rise  
of networks. She argues that England has experienced a shift from a state that collects  
data to a web of educational institutions that both pass data upwards but also internally  
judge themselves against their own and others. data through a variety of proprietary  
software tools– holding heads, teachers and subject teams to account for below average  
student performance against objective benchmarks. Thus, in England, the profession  
becomes owned by the performativity agenda in its owning of and acting in response to  
this data.  
 
However, the broader cultures and technologies of this approach are simply not available  
to SADC or African governments. Thus, weak statistics combine with underdeveloped  
state capacities and restricted institutions to undermine much of the key work that such  
statistics are supposed to do. Moreover, they exist in a particular socio-cultural milieu  
that also limits the desirability and effectiveness of such approaches. Governing by  
numbers in poorer countries thus seems doomed to failure at the present time.  
 
. The unbearable lightness of VET data  
 
It is widely accepted that VET data are weaker and more problematic than education  
data, both in the SADC region and globally. This is acknowledged in the UNESCO World  
Report on TVET (UNESCO, 2012), whilst a UNESCO regional report on Africa 
(UNESCOBREDA, 2010) argues that such data have got worse over recent years. The 
inadequacy of such data was also a key finding of our report and led to the regional 
Ministers agreeing to prioritise strengthening VET management and information systems, 
as part of a wider commitment to improved research, monitoring and evaluation.  
 
To some extent, this reflects the low status of VET in recent years (cf. McGrath, 2011  
and 2012). As Goldstein (2008) notes, decisions on what statistics to collect and with  
what vigour and rigour, is indicative of policy priorities, reflecting in turn wider societal  
debates and contestations in a process that is profoundly mediatised. In this, VET is not  
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a particular priority in most countries.  
 
However, there are also particular problems in how to define VET (McGrath, 2012;  
UNESCO, 2012) that have profound implications for what it means to collect and analyse  
VET statistics. What counts as VET enrolments in official education statistics is based on  
counting those in vocational streams in upper secondary schools or in public vocational  
institutions under the control of the Ministry of Education. However, the increasing  
hybridisation between academic and vocational education (UNESCO, 2012) makes it  
difficult to know what should be included here and what has been included by Ministry  
officials across national settings. Excluded from such enrolment figures, however, are  
the far larger numbers of learners who are engaged in vocational learning in settings  
such as public vocational institutions under other Ministries such as Health and  
Agriculture; private vocational colleges; and formal and informal sector workplaces.  
Neither in the 13 countries studied as part of the SADC/UNESCO project or elsewhere is  
it possible to be confident about the numbers engaged in VET in a particular country,  
making international comparisons fundamentally impossible.  
 
If enrolment data is fraught with serious problems, it can be imagined that there are  
even greater problems with notions of retention, success and destinations. Indeed, one  
of the most prolonged discussions in the SADC/UNESCO project design workshop was  
over the notion and measurement of success given that even public vocational systems  
were divided between examinations-and competency-based assessment; whilst some  
collected data by subject or module and others by qualification or candidate. Moreover,  
as with schooling, we were not confident that higher pass rates in VET, however defined,  
could be taken as an indicator of higher quality, being very mindful of the ways in which  
examinations results in particular are open to contestation and manipulation at various  
levels.  
 
Understandably, however, the SADC/UNESCO report needed to provide some such  
statistics and so the focus became one of trying to ensure as much agreement as  
possible across countries as to what could be counted that might be comparable.  
Alongside this, we insisted that each country monitoring report should contain meta-data  
regarding what definitions of particular indicators were used; what specific problems  
were encountered with the data; and what possible absences and irregularities might  
exist in the numbers presented. These are all sensible attempts to respond to some of  
Gorard.s concerns but it is clear that there is a strong risk that such meta-data gets seen  
as interference, distorting the clarity of the policy signal that was the very intention of  
gathering the data. In response, it is likely that comparative reporting of data will tend  
to reify the figures and omit the caveats. Indeed, one of the tensions that ran through  
the project was between our concern to avoid the easy construction of league tables and  
a regional concern to have clear evidence for benchmarking country performance.  
 
. The seductiveness of quasi-numbers  
 
All participants in the SADC/UNESCO process were sure that the sum of VET reform  
could not be captured by statistics alone. However, there was some interest in being  
able to look at and compare simple scores for as much of what was being examined as  
possible. This led us to develop a set of ordinal ratings, as noted above, for themes such  
as quality assurance, management information systems and industry involvement in  
VET. This followed the approach of previous single issue SADC reports (SADC, 2005 and  
2007).  
 
In every case, we strove to ensure that these numbers were the starting point of a  
discussion of a topic in the national reports. Each ordinal rating was followed by a  
detailed narrative justification of the grade given. However, it is clear that there is a real  
danger here too that the complexity and nuancing of the message is likely to get lost in  
the face of a simple number.  
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Such quasi-numbers also bring particular issues regarding how they are constructed and  
how they are then treated as real numbers subject to the usual tools of mathematical  
manipulation, such as the creation of a national mean score across indicators or  
comparisons of mean ratings across indicators.  
 
The creation of the numbers was a particularly complex process. We developed level  
descriptors for each ranking for each indicator and discussed these with national  
colleagues at the design workshop. However, we cannot be confident that we all  
understood these descriptors and the evidential requirements to justify particular ratings  
in the same way. Moreover, each rating was then subject to validation at national  
stakeholder workshops. There, a few ratings were adjusted and we have only limited  
access to the reasoning on which these adjustments were made (cf. Gorard’s concerns  
about the limited transparency of professional decisions regarding statistics above).  
 
By being constructed as numbers, these ratings took on an air of mathematical precision  
and scientific detachedness. However, it became apparent in our process of constructing  
a regional report that national reports reflected complex sociological and psychological  
processes. In a number of cases, our supposedly objective reading of the evidence as  
outsiders suggested a higher or lower ranking than that provided. In a number of cases,  
there appeared a tendency to consider that a policy being discussed was as significant as  
having a policy promulgated; and that a policy document was equivalent to a policy  
implemented with demonstrable evidence of outcomes and impacts. At least three things  
appear to be going on here. First, there was an optimism that the change process was  
simple and rapid. Second, there may also have been cases where political spin became a  
factor. Third, this relates to a policy turn in which international development cooperation  
has shifted from projects to policies. Whilst policies are supposed to be attractive  
because they ensure a greater scale of impact, this has also led to a new discourse in  
which the policy becomes everything. We will return to this in our discussion of “what  
works” below.  
 
In the particular case of South Africa, a rather different dynamic was at play. South  
African self-ratings were often in the middle range of national ratings on the ordinal  
indicators. These seemed to be more realistic, perhaps even pessimistic, than was the  
case in other countries, with there being a number of areas where we would have rated  
South Africa higher if adjusting the ratings across countries. This could be reflective of  
the far higher national capacity in South Africa to analyse VET performance based on  
already-available research. However, there also seemed to be at least two important  
temporal effects at play. First, having had a national qualifications framework, for  
instance, for 15 years, it was unlikely that South African evaluators and stakeholders  
could be seduced into thinking that there was anything but a long road to impact.  
Second, the project was investigating South African VET at a moment when there was a  
major national process of policy review linked to a new government (see Akoojee, 2012  
for more details). From Ministerial level, there had been a very clear message that key  
elements of the system were not working and this can be expected to have given  
informants permission to be critical.  
 
Temporal effects are likely to become even more significant in this process if, as is  
planned, the monitoring tool is readministered on a periodic basis. In an earlier  
programme of evaluation of a large donor intervention into a national VET system, one  
of us had seen fascinating trends at work as evaluators revisited institutions every six  
months over a three year period. As part of this process, members of governing bodies,  
leaders and teaching staff were asked to rate a series of areas of institutional  
performance on a scale of 1-10. In several institutions these ratings started high, with  
respondents arguing that new policies and practices were rapidly being put in place.  
They tended to keep the rating high on the next visit, noting that these reforms were  
taking some time, but were nearly there. However, there were a number of cases in year  
two when ratings plummeted as staff became despondent about the pace of change and  
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the obstacles faced in realising institutional change.  
 
 
“What works” and the search for evidence-based policy  
 
For SADC and key regional stakeholders there was a strong sense that the importance of  
the exercise lay in finding out more about what worked in VET nationally, regionally and  
internationally. This knowledge could then drive improvement. Throughout the process,  
we were challenged to provide more evidence of what worked and of best practices.  
However, we constantly found ourselves making two responses that pointed to the  
impossibility of doing this. First, we were clear that the process could not generate  
robust conclusions about what worked as the evidential basis was too weak. There was a  
dearth of available evaluative evidence on interventions, and what evidence there was  
would not satisfy the usual requirements of the “what works” tradition, being poorly  
designed or very limited in scale and scope. Several of the reports were also reluctant to  
make such claims. Essentially, most of what was presented as best practice was  
assertions by officials and project leaders. Second, however, there was even very little of  
this “weak” evidence. As we noted above when discussing the ordinal ratings, it was  
quite common for policy documents to be seen as evidence of impact. Countries differed  
in the extent to which national consultants were able to communicate successfully that  
having a policy does not constitute evidence of having had a developmental impact. We  
shall turn to this second set of issues before returning to the first.  
 
 
. How policy trumps impact  
 
We can speculate that part of the problem here may have to do with a key tension in  
development discourse and practice. As we have noted, there was a policy turn in  
development, which took place from the mid-1990s. Yet, at the same time, there was a  
rise of meta-level developmental goals, enshrined most powerfully in the MDGs. These  
place the achievement of a small number of measurable goals at the heart of the  
development enterprise. In our experience, these two contradictory tendencies get  
connected together through a key tool of development practice: the logframe (and  
similar tools). Thus, in the large, longitudinal evaluation mentioned above, the principal  
focus of the programme was on transforming public vocational providers into versions of  
the English further education college, with a strong emphasis on governance, leadership  
and industry engagement. This is what the evaluation team were exploring in their six  
monthly visits and what the national government and the Chief Technical Advisor  
understood as the heart of the programme. However, when at the end of the  
programme, a group of external evaluators were sent from the donor country to  
examine the programme, their focus was back on the logframe in the initial project  
documentation and the stated overall aim of the project: to reduce poverty. How the  
programme was supposed to have moved from institutional governance reforms to  
poverty reduction was never particularly clear, and certainly not convincing, in the initial  
documentation but this had been elided by those involved in it who had seen it as  
engaged in the important business of VET reform. The national evaluation team had  
strong evidence of what had worked and not worked in the programme in terms of its  
core business; but the donor team struggled to find evidence that the programme had  
really worked in terms of its overall aim.  
 
 
. Why “what works” won’t work  
 
However, beyond the rather soft concerns with what works and best practice in the  
SADC/UNESCO process there is a far harder edged drive emerging from a number of  
donors and the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation that seeks to export “what  
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works” approaches to social and economic development in the South.2  
 
As it emerged in the North, particularly initially in the USA, this approach was subjected  
to a range of political, epistemological and methodological critiques. Glass (1987), for  
instance, argues that the original “what works” study in American education was part of  
a Reaganite project to wrest control of knowledge away from “dangerous” academics and  
to restore power to “right-thinking” people. He shows how the process was intensely  
political from the start without a rigorous methodology of proving what works. Areas  
where there was a lack of quantitative data couldn’t be known about and some areas of  
heated contestation were similarly unknowable as there was no “what works” to be  
distilled. However, there was also a lack of an attempt at rigorous meta-analysis where  
this could have been possible.  
 
Schoenfeld (2006) notes that the What Works Clearinghouse that built on this initial  
initiative had clear criteria for what research could be considered:  
 
• Randomised experiments  
• Quasi-experiments that use equating procedures  
• Studies that use the regression discontinuity design  
 
In a similar vein to Gorard’s critique of statistics above, however, he argues that there is  
too much minute difference in studies to be confident in doing meta-analyses.  
 
Schoenfeld’s concern is that it is very difficult to do such work rigorously enough, but for  
many in the education-for-development community the concern is more an  
epistemological one. There are strong epistemological traditions in comparative  
education (Crossley, Broadfoot and Schweisfurth 2007) that question whether education  
can be known in the ways assumed by the “what works” approach, stressing instead the  
constructed, contingent and contextual nature of the social world.  
 
However, it appears that this might be one of the most important challenges for  
international and comparative educators in the next few years. In a recent paper  
(McGrath, 2010b), one of us wrote of how we as a community needed to think carefully  
of why we were so marginal to debates about development when compared with  
economists. Our sense is that the rise of “what works” exacerbates this challenge and  
reinforces the need for critical reflection on whether we do want to try to influence policy  
and, if so, how we can best do this in the light of the power of other approaches and  
disciplines.  
 
Whatever the merits of these critiques of the “what works” approach, at the present time  
it is simply impossible to apply this to the field of VET in Africa. Even in South Africa, it  
would be impossible to find a single study of VET that met the criteria Schoenfeld lists  
above. However, this contrasts with the rise in VET’s importance in development  
thinking, especially on and in Africa, in the very recent past (cf. McGrath, 2011 and  
2012). Thus, we are faced with a fundamental problem for evidence-based policy: VET  
interventions will be funded because there is political will but there is no evidence base  
on which to do this. This was the challenge that SADC and UNESCO faced in the project  
under consideration here but this led them quickly to a realisation that the way forward  
lay in broader and more flexible understandings of what counts as evidence.  
 
As there is a turn back to VET in Africa, it seems vital that the question of evidence be  
taken seriously. As was noted above, the SADC Ministers of Education have agreed that  
better research, evaluation and management information systems are of strategic  
importance, and a similar argument is advanced by UNESCO in the World Report. There  
                                                          
2
 We are indebted to Kenneth King for reminding us that the World Bank showed an early interest in “what  
works” approaches to international education. 
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are good reasons why VET research in Africa is so weak at present (Carton, 2011).  
These would include familiar critiques of structurally-adjusted educational research; the  
low status of VET and hence its research; the negative effects of consultancy on research  
output; and the unwillingness of many implementers to generate rigorous and published  
evaluation. However, it is evident that the research community has a responsibility to  
show agency in responding to a new opportunity for rigorous VET research. Our  
epistemological position suggests that such research must use a variety of methods, and  
should not forget the importance of listening to the hitherto silenced voices of learners  
(Powell, 2012) alongside any rise of experimental methods.  
 
 
Policy science for policy learning  
 
Policy learning has become an important strand of thinking about the evidence-policy  
link in VET in recent years due largely to the efforts of the European Training Foundation  
(Grootings, 2004; Chakroun, 2008 and 2010).  
 
As we have discussed, cross-border peer learning was one of the key purposes of the  
SADC/UNESCO project, and of the development of a monitoring tool in particular. As we  
noted much earlier in this article, monitoring tools have been used for policy learning  
purposes in Europe. ReferNet was introduced in 2002 to raise transparency in European  
VET and to improve knowledge about systems, to facilitate cross-border knowledge  
sharing amongst experts. Given the major differences between VET systems in Europe,  
 
ReferNet was intended to “provide information to facilitate cooperation within a spirit of  
trust and to enable us to learn from one another” (Hippach-Schnieder, 2009: 28). The  
reports are intended to enable countries to monitor progress towards European VET  
policy priorities. According to the European Commission, the indicators are also to be  
used as a tool for understanding the reasons for differences in performance, and to  
support learning between countries on best practices (Dunkel, 2009).  
 
Within the research literature, policy learning is distinguished from policy borrowing.  
Whilst both are voluntary and initiated by the recipient country, policy borrowing  
involves particular policies that a country seeks to imitate or copy from another (Dale,  
1999; McGrath, 2010a). Policy learning, in contrast, is intended to be “a way for  
governments and systems of governance to inform policy development by drawing  
lessons from available evidence and experience” (Chakroun, 2008: 12). As well as  
drawing on the experiences of other countries, the evidence from which lessons are  
learned may be based on a country’s own experience. Central to the idea of policy  
learning is that as a process it leads to policy change and increasing policy effectiveness  
(Grootings, 2004). This points to the need for evidence about policy effectiveness.  
 
As McGrath (2010b) notes, the nature of the distinction between policy borrowing and  
policy learning can be rather subtle. He suggests that it is often “in the eye of the  
beholder” and may in the end be analogous to the difference between deep and surface  
learning (McGrath, 2010b). However, advocates of policy learning processes argue that  
differences are evident in the way that policy development processes are supported,  
facilitating inclusive learning processes, and evident in reformed policies that derive  
from, respond to and are driven by national contexts (Chakroun, 2010).  
 
In a recent paper, Raffe distinguished between policy learning as “science” which “aims  
to identify valid policy lessons from other countries experiences” and policy learning as  
“sociology”: “the learning that occurs, and the cross national influences on behaviour”  
(Raffe, 2011: 284). Raffe’s distinction is valuable as it draws attention to the nature of  
the process of learning from experience. We understand his use of science to mean  
robust research, and as supporting research from a range of methodological positions,  
rather than a prioritisation of a particular form of scientific methodology, unlike the  




“what works” approach.  
 
In his paper introducing this distinction, Raffe demonstrates policy learning as science by  
carrying out a review of a particular policy (the NQF in Scotland) and considering to what  
extent, and why, the policy may be considered a success. In considering evidence to  
support both a “celebratory account” and a “skeptical account”, and then comparing  
them, Raffe draws additional valuable lessons for policy development and offers us a  
deeper understanding of policy, its context and the nature and range of lessons that may  
be drawn therefrom. For Raffe, policy learning starts with researching experience, and  
reflecting on this within the practice of research. The lessons are drawn within the  
research domain. This corresponds to the deeper learning to which McGrath referred.  
 
Possibilities for evidence-based policy learning about VET system development were  
limited within the SADC region by weaknesses in the VET knowledge base, as we have  
already noted. The lack of research is compounded by significant weaknesses in research  
dissemination, so that even research that has been carried out may not be widely  
known, and can perhaps be easily excluded from policy learning processes. This has  
already been recognised as an important contributing factor to a lack in policy learning in  
other regions (Chakroun, 2008).  
 
As we noted earlier, VET statistics are made more problematic by the range and  
complexity of meanings and settings for VET. This also undermines policy learning as  
there is a weak co-construction of technical language available for cross-border dialogue.  
The construction of scientific accounts about VET, and in particular, comparative analysis  
of these accounts, is currently constrained by a lack of clarity about what VET is, and  
what the sector includes (and why). The development of a language through which  
dialogue about VET may be constructed, enacted, and communicated may imply the  
need for a taxonomy for VET (Shoesmith, 2011), although such a task is challenging.  
 
The SADC monitoring tool provided a standardised set of indicators, sub-indicators and  
reporting formats through which different VET systems could be consistently described  
and assessed. Even so, the reports themselves reveal that these could not be  
standardised but were constructed within a series of dimensions, or tensions. These are  
not discrete categories, but the polarities represent a heuristic device for exploring how  
evidence-based accounts are also constructed in relative terms. The differential  
constructions of reports make it impossible to learn from cross-national experiences by  
simply reading across reports or making superficial comparisons between accounts in  
different reports.  
 
As accounts of different systems are constructed differently in relation to each  
dimension, part of the complexity in cross-country policy learning derives from different  
constructions of research, of evaluation or of monitoring. However, exploring the  
tendencies within which reports are developed may open up methodological discussions  
that will strengthen both the science of policy learning and shared understandings of  
what counts as “evidence”. 
 
 
• research knowledge and political knowledge  
 
Using Raffe’s lenses, developing an account of a VET system is both a scientific process  
of collecting data through robust research methods, analysis and reporting, and a  
political process. Scientific validity of the account rests on the quality of the research  
process used and the quality of the data gleaned. Political validity is also built through  
particular methods, which may be contextually dependent. This is evident, for example,  
in practices such as the requirement to sign off reports at political levels, through a  
particular political process to validate data, in the institutional home from which the  
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report is written, and to which it is tabled. It has implications for what may be reported,  
by whom, and when.  
 
Both forms of knowledge were essential within the SADC/UNESCO project, were  
deployed in constructing the validity of the research, and needed to be managed during  
the process. This is not unique to this project. For instance, difficulties in reconciling  
political and research processes have been managed in the German ReferNet reports  
through the use of two distinct sections: one completed by the Federal Ministry of  
Education and Research, and the other summarising academic research and other data  
(Hippach-Schneider, 2009).  
 
 
• policy and performance  
 
This tension refers to a tension between policy claims and system performance. As we  
have noted, the dearth of data, combined with the discursive turn to policy, leads to  
cases where policy eclipses performance to such an extent that having a policy vision  
becomes conflated with performance. In the absence of data on performance, policy  
learning is replaced by the exchange of policy claims. Allais points to problems generated  
by a lack of evidence of policy performance in the case studies of several NQFs recently  
carried out by the ILO (Allais, 2010).  
 
 
• “outsider” and “insider” perspectives  
 
Reports of VET systems may be constructed as written from outside the system, as  
objective observations; or they may be presented as self-assessments from inside the  
system. In the SADC/UNESCO project, possibilities for being outside a national system  
were limited, particularly in the small states that amount to half of the member states.  
National researchers may have been engaged from a range of positions, for example  
within a national think-tank, or as consultants, but these are not necessarily associated  
with objectivity. In constructing accounts, tensions exist between the status of objective  
outsider and knowing insider. At the regional stakeholder workshop towards the close of  
the project, the delegates proposed that future iterations of the monitoring process  
should be housed within VET systems so that reporting was part of a national self- 
assessment process. This reflects a significant move away from the pilot where national  
reports were filtered through the editorial lens of external consultants and, therefore,  
potentially capable of greater distancing from issues of local politics. If desired, this  
would need to be mediated within regional structures or processes.  
 
 
• “positive” and “critical” accounts  
 
We have already referred to our observation that some ordinal ratings and narrative  
accounts appeared to be optimistic or pessimistic, whilst Raffe used the terms  
celebratory and skeptical. What is driving both distinctions is a concern that there are  
different presentation styles through which data can be refracted, giving potentially very  
different interpretations. The construction of a report as positive or critical can be a  
matter of tone, but is also reflected in the selections – and omissions -of data, or  
particular research studies, and in the construction of the argument made based on the  
data reviewed. Indeed, it is this dichotomy to which Raffe points us, and uses  
productively in his demonstration of the science of policy learning.  
 
Certain methods, such as stakeholder interviews, may also shape the overall shape of  
the data and therefore whether optimistic or pessimistic readings are available. As we  
noted above, our experience across several projects suggests that increasingly  
pessimistic accounts may emerge over time. This makes longitudinal policy learning  
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particularly challenging. We have also noted that the political context may shape the  
possibility for critical accounts. In some contexts it is not politically acceptable to be  
critical or optimistic. Thus, further temporal, but also spatial, effects enter into the  
analysis of what can and should be learned.  
 
Finally, as is often the case, perceptions about the report’s audience may shape the  
nature of the report. Concerns that reports may be used for purposes other than those  
intended by the respondents can be influential. For example concerns about a critical  
external gaze may reinforce a tendency towards optimism. Indeed, it was interesting to  
note in the SADC/UNESCO project that national stakeholders were often caught between  
a desire to be honest about their system’s failings in their own interventions and a  
tendency to be defensive if others seemed to be drawing negative lessons from their  
systems. Learning is always fraught with dangers and policy learning seems to lead to  
particular risks that need to be managed by participants. However, their management  
strategies may also limit or distort peer learning.  
 
 
• purposes for cross-national peer learning and for accountability  
 
The language of peer learning is very different from the critique of governing by  
numbers above. However, in practice the “terrors of performativity” (Ball, 2003) are  
never far from the surface in policy learning. Thus, although the monitoring report was  
expressly couched in terms of peer learning, it was evident that there were concerns  
that this could also be a tool for monitoring performance. In the OECD and EU, peer  
reviews exert influence through peer pressure although this is still often weak when  
compared to the pressure exerted through international rankings, such as PISA  
(Hippach-Schneider; Dunkel; Speer, all 2009). In the SADC/UNESCO project, we were  
very resistant to what we perceived as a pressure from some participants to produce a  
series of what could be read as league tables, but the data and analysis clearly has a life  
beyond our control.  
 
More positively, we see merits in stressing that policy learning is both science and  
sociology. It does have the potential to build a more collaborative model of policy  
making, including a wider range of stakeholders and through more democratic  
processes, thus changing the way policies are made (Raffe and Spours, 2007; Chakroun,  
2008). It can also lead to the generation of more robust analyses of multiple forms of  
data.  
 
However, this needs to be balanced against the way that travelling policies such as the  
VET and governance toolkits shape discursive possibilities in countries and regions. It  
must also be remembered that national policy learning is undermined internally in many  
fragile states or in cases of acute aid dependency. To the latter, we can add in practice  
the context of EU accession states. For these countries (at least before the crisis  
afflicting the EU as we write) becoming part of the EU is all that matters and there is  
little point in wasting time in policy learning about aspects of VET when the policy  
imperative is to sign up to everything that the EU considers best practice in this sector  
and others.  
 
 
An implicit theory of policy  
 
What appears as a key tension in these accounts, but also in the SADC/UNESCO project,  
is a theory of how policy works. Whereas the policy learning account sees policymaking  
as arising from a public dialogue about what works; the other strands discussed above  
are grounded in a far narrower technical understanding of both evidence and debate.  
However, in all these approaches there appears to be a view that good policy decisions  
can and will be made through technical or dialogic processes. Yet, of course, this stands  
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in stark contrast to a lengthy tradition in thinking about educational policymaking that is  
informed by sociological and political economy traditions. Here, policy is often  
understood as discourse, and may travel, be fished out of a garbage can and / or may be  
a palimpsest.  
 
We have also noted at various points in this article that policy is assumed to flow  
unproblematically into implementation. Indeed, there is often a faith in an almost  
alchemical transformation of base policy into the pure gold of development impact  
simply because the words of the policy have been invoked. Yet, again, the world of  
academic accounts of policy, implementation and change are full of notions of policy as  
rhetoric; of implementation as resistance and reinterpretation; and of change as messy  
and reversible.  
 
These accounts of how policy is made are those that we are grounded in as academics  
but they have the potential for leading us down a path towards the inevitable  
incommensurability of academic and policy knowledge. It can encourage international  
and comparative educators to see their proper role as theory-based critics of policies  
that must always fail due to their unsafe epistemological groundings; whilst  
policymakers and officials will tend to take an understandable counter view that this  
research is neither rigorous nor relevant. This, of course, would mirror much of the  
debate about educational research in England that began in the late 1990s (e.g.,  
Hargreaves, 1996; Hammersley, 2002; Whitty, 2006). However, as Whitty argued in his  
inaugural presidential address to the British Educational Research Association, it is  
important to try to break out of the impasse between entrenched positions stressing the  




CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THERE MUST BE SOME KIND OF WAY OUT OF HERE  
 
The SADC/UNESCO project that has been the principal source for our reflections in this  
article sought, albeit largely unconsciously, to reject the divide between academic and  
policy knowledge. The project was on the face of it delivered through a consultancy  
mode that could easily have privileged only policy knowledge. However, there was a  
desire to engage with academic knowledge and this led to a conscious decision to choose  
a largely academic team of regional consultants to lead the project, and to include a  
review of research literature as a key method for data collection. Moreover, throughout  
the process, there was a clear sense that the project team, and particularly the project  
director, were seen as having a powerful knowledge resource that merited respect even  
where this was not the kind of knowledge that the commissioning agencies themselves  
saw as the most valuable.  
 
For us as the lead consultants too the process was one of repeated bridging and  
translation work, across the boundaries of what we considered robust data and  
knowledge; the attempt to meet consultancy norms regarding speed, cost and client  
relationship maintenance; and our commitment to a genuine dialogue with policy and  
policymakers.  
 
Together as commissioners of this work and as researchers we constructed a  
methodology that sought to balance political and scientific imperatives; to balance local  
contexts and regional comparability; and to use multiple sources of data and approaches  
to analysis and reporting in order to provide a better basis for policy. We embraced the  
dualism that Raffe saw as being at the heart of policy learning and tried to make the  
tension a creative one.  
 
In reflecting on the project, we still believe that this was successful and worthwhile.  
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Nonetheless, the project has also served to stimulate us to reflect more widely on the 
policy-research relationship. Like Whitty, we reject the attempt to recreate research in  
the policymaker’s likeness. We cannot but see research and policy through critical lenses  
such as power, but we also cannot walk away from the challenge of seeking to help  
make better policy.  
 
Particularly for VET in Africa, where our case study was located, the scope for “what  
works” or statistically-driven approaches to policy and practice is almost non-existent at  
present. This may suggest that those development cooperation agencies that are  
increasingly wedded to such approaches need to realise that rather than criticising  
researchers for failing in rigour, they should make a serious attempt to fund the kind of  
research that they think matters or be more realistic in their notion of useful knowledge. 
They do need to consider approaches to such research that strengthen, national  
policymaking capacities.  
 
For policymakers, there is a similar challenge in investing in data, something that the  
SADC Ministers have acknowledged and UNESCO has recommended at the global level.  
However, there is a further challenge of thinking more critically about what the  
relationship between policies and impacts are and being prepared to explore this even  
when it is uncomfortable.  
 
However, we want to finish with a challenge to our own community and to reiterate that  
there are pressing needs for international and comparative educators to be clearer in  
seeking to shape research agendas; more rigorous in their approaches to research; and  
better in their external communication of their findings. As this is a special issue on VET,  
it is important to reiterate the particular challenge of reawakening research on VET-for 
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